AT the end of the previous chapter we pointed out that our admission of a limited and temporary sphere wherein God’s kingdom has yet to come — ‘the world lieth in the evil one’ — will be a strange idea to the Muslim. Muslim friends of the present writer have been quick to seize upon this point and to insist that, although Christians may think that the sovereignty of Allah is a unified dualism (see page 4), yet Christians themselves appear to accept something very like an actual dualism in this present situation in world-history! Did not John Wycliff say that in this world ‘God must obey the Devil’?
A fear of admitting any kind of dualism has been present in the mind of Islam from the very earliest times, and particularly during that period in the first century of Islamic history, in which Islam first came into contact with a strong Christian tradition at Damascus. Inspired by Christian teachings, certain unorthodox Muslims asserted that Allah allowed man power (qadar) in the creation of his acts[1] and, because they believed in both human and divine creativeness, were accused by the orthodox of being dualists. Orthodox Islam has never shown any interest in purely psychological questions connected with the ‘freedom of the will’, but, as we have aiready noted in the previous chapter when discussing iktisab and ikhtiyar, is primarily concerned to defend Allah’s creativeness and to define the form of words to be used when imputing legal responsibility to man for his actions. This approach to the problem is inseparable from its doctrine of Allah, since, as we have already noted (see page 45), Islam maintains that if man were creative in any respect, whether in act, thought or will, then there would be other creators in the universe. This, the orthodox hasten to add, cannot be — the Sole Creator is Allah. Partly because of their fear of any suggestion of dualism, orthodox Muslims opposed the teachings of the Qadariya and Mutazila (the former maintained a ‘creation’ of acts by man, and the latter a ‘generation’); and the rigidly determinist tone of Islamic traditions and theology was inspired to a large extent by the orthodox denial that there can be any thought or action which is not directly and immediately created by Allah Himself.
From a Christian point of view, we see in all this an unwillingness on the part of orthodox Islam to admit the possibility of a (Biblical) relationship of grace between God and man, and also a denial of the uniquely Biblical doctrine of God’s sovereignty of grace, which we shall be considering in Chapter 7 of this present work. Islam insists that Allah must act in a manner which is consistent with His power and majesty — because the Quran itself insists on this point. The theologically integrated position of Muslim orthodoxy is thus perfectly understandable. In actual practice, however, one finds that there are a great many Indian Muslims who are unaware of the theological significance of such a term as ikhtiyar and suggest that it means ‘freedom of the will’, without having any idea of the creative function of a free will.
This superficial interest in ‘free-will’ is no doubt due to the challenge of Christian and Western thought. It is, nevertheless, quite clear that the ‘socially progressive’ Indian Muslim who holds them is not in the least conscious of the theological disintegration that would be brought about in Islam if such ideas were maintained in the field of orthodox theology. In the present writer’s experience, Muslims who hold such opinions are not theologians; they are certainly not aware of the fact that, in asserting a free will in man, they are thereby affirming that there are other creative agencies in the universe, and, from the orthodox point of view, are partakers in the error of the Dualists. An affirmation of human freedom by Muslims may justly be regarded as a vague and unsystematic aspiration which has no roots in any kind of Muslim theological system. It is the ‘theology’ of men who have had some contact with Christian influence or Western education, and although (from the point of view of Islam) it is corrupt and misleading in itself, it should be encouraged by the Christian preacher, in that it may lead the Muslim away from the rigid determinism of orthodox Islam to seek his peace of mind and heart in ideas which are at home in another view of God, man, and the Universe.
We do not however intend to pursue the question of the ‘freedom of the will’, but, following the pattern of Islamic theology, to turn to the more fundamental question of the nature and function of reason. As we do so, we shall be enabled not only to see man’s ‘freedom’ from the point of view of Muslim orthodoxy, but also to appreciate the rigorous manner in which Islam interprets the dogma of the Divine creativeness.
Thus far in this book we have been discussing those aspects of Islam which suggest to the Christian reader that a Muslim thinks entirely in terms of the external appointment and decree of Allah. Man’s acts and his destiny are externally created and inescapable; but what of his inner experience, the exercise of his reason, of repentance, faith and love? Do we meet with the same kind of rigid external appointment here as elsewhere? Is there an area of freedom for man wherein he can really act as from himself?
In this chapter we shall discuss reason and repentance. We shall consider reason first, because the way in which Islam thinks of the functioning of reason throws light on the conception which orthodox Islam has of repentance and (as we shall find in the next chapter) of faith also. The more extreme Sufis despised the function of reason in matters of faith, but the great and influential al Ghazali writes of reason with reverence and respect. He quotes a Tradition with a Neoplatonist flavour which accords to reason a primary place in creation: ‘The first thing which Allah created was Reason.’[2] He also states in the same passage that both angels and men strive to serve Allah by means of reason. By virtue of the theological exercise of reason (an exercise which some orthodox schools hold to be obligatory for man) the ‘faith of knowledge’ of the theologian is distinguished favourably from the ‘faith of tradition’ of the common people. This does not mean that the orthodox agree with the Mutazila in making reason the criterion of faith, but orthodoxy affirms that, through the endowment of reason, man becomes the subject of legal obligations and is able thereby to practise the works of Islam. It is also an axiom of Muslim theology that reason supports the law of Islam. When, however, rational arguments will not serve, then recourse is had to authority. In practice this means that reason is employed to prove the non-impossibility of Islamic dogmas but, when reason fails, the problems of Islamic theology are related to the mystery of Allah and His will.
There are certain points in the above statement with which the Christian reader will not be wholly unsympathetic. Christian theology can, for example, understand and approve of the Muslim theologian’s reverential pause before mysteries which are matters of revealed truth. When, however, we examine Muslim beliefs concerning the function and practice of human reason, we find the familiar pattern appearing once more, and discover that these beliefs are connected with the Muslim dogma of Allah’s creation. The orthodox Muslim theologians declare that man must use reason in order to come to a knowledge of credal and other matters, but add that this reason is not a free discursive exercise which (as the unorthodox Mutazila maintained) itself ‘engenders’ knowledge.[3] According to the majority of the orthodox theologians of Islam, reasoning itself is an accident which is directly created in man by Allah, like all other forms of perception and sensation (cp. page 5 f). Knowledge also is an additional ‘something’ which is directly created by Allah following the act of reasoning. For this reason the Muslim regards the experiences of a dream as being as ‘real’ as the thoughts of waking life. Allah creates both. Every process of reflection is therefore a series of new accidents created in the human substance.
The process of human thought like all Allah’s creation, is discontinuous in itself and dependent for its existence on the immediate impulse of Allah’s will. al Ghazali has expressed it in this way: ‘No act of (Allah’s) slave, even though it be acquired (cp. iktisab), is independent of the will of Allah for its existence. Whatever occurs in this world or the spirit-world, whether it be the wink of an eye, the heart’s inclination, or a glance; whether it be good or evil, benefit or hurt, Islam or unbelief, knowledge or ignorance, deliverance or loss, deception or guidance, obedience or rebellion, polytheism or faith — all occur through Allah’s pre-determination and decree, His will and pleasure. . . . He leads astray whom He wills and guides whom He wills.’[4] Such a statement is, of course, the corollary to the Muslim dogma of Allah as the sole Creator. If thought were free, it would be creative, and, as we have had occasion to note before, orthodox Islamic theology holds that there can be but one creative activity in the universe — the creative activity of Allah.
al Ashari, the founder of one of the orthodox schools of Islamic theology, declared that knowledge follows reason by ‘habit’. Allah creates reasoning and, in the same discontinuous fashion, He creates knowledge after it. There is an habitual juxtaposition of reasoning and knowledge, but it is, of course, a habit which depends for its continuance upon the will of Allah. Other orthodox theologians have described the relation between reason and knowledge as a ‘necessary connection’ or a ‘logical link’, but all are agreed that knowledge is not produced by reasoning; Allah directly creates both. The theologians then go on say that sound reasoning is followed by knowledge (if Allah wills), but false reasoning (which is also Allah’s creation) is sterile — it is followed by nothing!
The Indian Muslim will know something about the great names mentioned above. He will know of al Ashari and may have read some of the works of al Ghazali in Urdu or Tamil translations. Nevertheless, when one presents facts of this kind to the average Muslim, and informs him that orthodox Islamic theology holds that Allah is the author of all man’s thought, reasoning and knowledge, he may plead ignorance of the teachings of the theologians. The Muslim is not unlike the average Christian in that he may, mistakenly, imagine that there is a great gulf fixed between theology and Scripture; and, therefore, the Muslim may perhaps say to us, ‘I know nothing about the opinions of the theologians, I only know the Book of Allah, the Quran.’ On behalf of the theologians we may then assure our Muslim friend that such ideas are derived from the doctrine of Allah’s sole creativeness, and are based on the teaching of the Quran. The endowment of reason as a direct gift of Allah may be established on the basis of Quranic teaching. In Surah 39 v. 19 we read: ‘They it is whom Allah guides, and they it is who are endowed with minds;’ and in Surah 2 v. 272: ‘He bringeth wisdom unto whom He will, and he who is brought wisdom is brought much good; but none will remember save those endowed with minds.’ There are many such passages and this Quranic teaching, combined with the dogma of Allah’s sole power of creation, has produced the doctrine that Allah creates both human reasoning and its attendant knowledge.
The Christian who is familiar with the significance of the Biblical term ‘repentance’ and is aware that it means ‘to change one’s mind’, may be forgiven if he has already made up his mind concerning the meaning given to the word ‘repentance’ by Islam. It would however be very misleading to assume that the word has the same significance in Islam as it has in the context of Biblical theology; and it is therefore advisable to study the Islamic doctrine in its own light.
In the course of our discussion of the Muslim conception of sin we concluded that, although the Christian might agree with the Quranic definition of certain acts as ‘sins’, yet we cannot find any awareness in Islamic theology of the Biblical teaching concerning the nature of sin. The same might be said about the orthodox Islamic conception of repentance. The Quran asserts that man must repent for acts of evil, rebellion and disobedience. These are acts which a Christian also would regard as calling for repentance. But when we consider the context in which the Quranic terms are employed and the judgement of the great Muslim theologians on those terms, we find that, despite a similarity of language, the Christian and the Muslim look at the matter of repentance from different viewpoints. In Islam the conception of repentance is in conformity with the nature of Allah. The familiar pattern appears yet again and, as man’s reason is sub-ordained to and determined by Allah’s creation, so also man’s repentance is directly related in Muslim thought to Allah’s initiative and control.
The similarity of language referred to above is very striking in such passages as Jeremiah 31:18 f: ‘. . .turn thou me and I shall be turned; for thou art the Lord my God. Surely after that I was turned I repented; and after that I was instructed. . . I was ashamed.’ The words used here for ‘turn’ and ‘repent’ (or better, ‘regret’) have their counterparts in the Arabic Quran, as we shall see in the course of our treatment of this subject; but we must not for this reason be led to identify that which a righteous God does for man in His grace, with that which Allah imposes on man by His will. Allah turns the hearts of men to an evil destiny or to Paradise. The initiative and the creative act are His, and man’s repentance cannot be divorced from Allah’s dominant will. We have already noted (page 48) that, when Muhammad the prophet wished to marry the wife of his adopted son, he ascribed the thoughts and intents of his heart to Allah by exclaiming, ‘Praised be Allah who changeth the hearts!’ Allah steps in between man and his heart (Surah 8 v. 24), and the teaching of the Traditions again gives point and emphasis to the teaching of the Quran in this matter. One very well-known Tradition reads: ‘The apostle of Allah said: The hearts of the sons of Adam are all between two fingers of the Merciful, like one heart. He turneth them as He wills. The apostle of Allah said: O Allah! Turn our hearts to obey Thee.’ In another Tradition we are informed that the oath which the prophet used most frequently was ‘No: by the Turner of hearts!’[5]
The Quran asks men (Surah 10 v. 33): ‘What is there after the truth but error? How then can ye turn away?’ and such Traditions provide the answer. Allah turns the hearts of men.
Three important Arabic roots, used in the Quran[6] to denote repentance, are found in the form of parallel ideas in successive verses in the Quran (Surah 13 vv. 27-29): ‘. . . Allah leads whom he will astray, but guides unto Him those who turn again. . . Good cheer for them and an excellent resort . . . Upon Him do I rely and unto Him is my repentance.’ In the above verses ‘turn again’ stands for the root N W B, ‘resort’ for ’ W B, and ‘repentance’ for T W B. Verse 30 of the same Surah however reminds us that ‘. . . if Allah had pleased He would have guided men altogether,’ and this statement, in the eyes of the orthodox, interprets all that precedes verse 30. The most important verb is that which is used at the end of verse 29 and is rendered ‘repentance’. It is used most frequently and applied to both man and Allah.[7]
This verb has as its noun the well-known word ‘tawba’ which is known to most Muslims in India. When used of man it means ‘to turn’ or ‘to have resort to Allah’. Before we discuss the uses of this verb, however, there is one further point which requires elucidation. A study of the Quran reveals that, as Allah has the power to turn men as He pleases, so also the evildoer is said to have the power to turn men away from Islam: ‘. . . they turn folk from His way’ (Surah 9 v. 9); and Satan also ‘turned them from the path so that they are not guided’ (Surah 27 v. 24). Is it possible for sinners and Satan to do such things independently of Allah? A study of other passages will answer our question, for we read in Surah 14 vv. 3 f: ‘(unbelievers) turn folks from the path of Allah. . . But Allah leads whom He will astray and guides whom He will.’ Unbelievers are ‘turned aside from the path. But whomsoever Allah doth lead astray, no guide has he (Surah 13 v. 33). It is because of such passages as the above that Islamic theology cannot tolerate the idea of secondary causes or mediatory agents. There can be no sphere of activity outside Allah’s control.
We now turn to the uses of the root T W B. Some interesting comparisons may profitably be made regarding the manner in which this root is used in the Quran and the use of Biblical terms. The Hebrew root N H M, when used of God, generally means ‘regret’ or ‘repent’, as in Jeremiah 15:6, ‘I am weary of repenting’ (unlike Allah, as we shall shortly see); it is only twice used of man’s repentance for sin (Jeremiah 8:6 and Job 42:6). In all other cases in the Old Testament the idea of repentance for sin is represented by the use of the Hebrew root SH W B (to turn, repent). On the other hand, we find that the Arabic root T W B is used indiscriminately both for Allah’s turning and for man’s repentance for sin. The turning of Allah is, of course, represented as being of a superlative degree; in some cases this is suggested by an intensive form of the word and Allah is called al Tawwab.[8]
When a close examination is made of the Quranic verses in which the above root is used, one’s attention is immediately attracted by such passages as: ‘Yet am I forgiving’ (says Allah) ‘unto him who repents and believes and does right, and then is guided’ (Surah 20 v. 84).
It appeals to the Christian reader as a kind of ‘proof text’, and might be compared to the teaching of John the Baptist. We also find such passages as Surah 9 v. 119: ‘Then He turned again towards them that they might also turn; verily, Allah, He is easily turned and merciful.’ Here Allah turns to man so that man may turn to Him. This order is reversed in Surah 4 v. 21: ‘Allah is only bound to turn again towards those who do evil through ignorance and then turn again quickly.’ Also in Surah 6 v. 54: ‘Verily, he of you who does evil in ignorance, and then turns again and does right, — verily He is forgiving, merciful.’ The quick turning to Allah after sin is thus regarded as efficacious, but if a man turns on his death-bed his repentance will not be accepted: ‘His turning again is not for those who do evil until, when death comes before one of them, he says, “Now I turn again”; nor yet for those who die in misbelief’ (Surah 4 v. 22).
To repent is a mark of the believer, and Muhammad himself is told so to do in Surah 11 v. 114: ‘Do thou then be upright, as thou art bidden, and whosoever turns repentantly with thee.’ Nevertheless, all is as Allah chooses: ‘But as for him who turns again and believes and does right, it may be that he will be among the prosperous. For thy Lord creates what He pleases and chooses; they have not the choice’ (Surah 28 v. 67).
There are a number of passages in which Allah is described as ‘One who loves to turn’ (Surah 2 v. 35, etc), and He does so even in order to gratify man’s carnal appetites (Surah 2 v. 183). In Surah 9 v. 27, however, we read: ‘Then Allah turns after that to whom He will, for Allah is forgiving, merciful’.
It is not easy to make a clear-cut distinction between the Quranic and Biblical teachings about repentance if we deal with such teachings in isolation. One might assume that, since both man and Allah ‘turn’ and the same verb is used for both, that in the Quran there is no sense of the nature of sin. It is also significant that man repents in vain under certain circumstances, and that his repentance prevails only when Allah is turned to him. But to seize upon such isolated passages is not a fruitful method of study of the Quran, nor will it lead the Christian student to a clear grasp of the manner in which Islam thinks of repentance. For this one must study the opinions of the great Muslim theologians who, from a sure grasp of the entire Muslim system of thought and in conformity with the central Islamic doctrine of the nature of Allah, have integrated and interpreted the teaching of the Quran concerning repentance.
The opinions of the great theologians, as we find them summarized in Tahanawi’s book Kashshaf istilahat al Funun, are of great assistance to us, in that they reveal the manner in which Islam itself has understood the uses of the root T W B. The article in which this root is discussed in the above encyclopaedia of the Islamic sciences, gives the meaning of the root as ‘to relinquish, repent, regret’. There then follows an interesting discussion which reveals that Islam entertains the idea of repentance only for individual sins. The question is also asked whether a man can repent for sins of which he is no longer capable. Here again we meet with the idea of repentance as being a speedy and immediate ‘turning’. The validity of repentance with a ‘time limit’ is also discussed, as, for example, when a man says that he will not commit a certain sin for a year. The opinion of the orthodox theologians is that repentance is not a permanent forsaking of evil but a turning after each act of sin. Allah changes men’s heart from one state to another, and the sin may be committed again and require another repentance.
This discussion is of great value in that, as in the case of the Muslim conception of sin, it reveals to us that Islam thinks of these matters in terms of isolated acts. For Islamic theology, man is not a ‘sinner’; i.e., he is not by nature in such a condition that, whether any overt evil act be performed or not, he is in a ‘state of sin’. For Islam man is a being who commits sin (if Allah wills), and man does not repent for what he is, but for what, at any given moment, he may do.
When we enquire further of the Muslim theologians concerning the connection between repentance and forgiveness, we are informed that in granting forgiveness Allah is not conditioned by the presence or absence of human repentance. In conformity with the Muslim dogma of Allah’s immediate and continuous creation of each existence and action, sin is regarded as a matter of immediately created sinful acts for each of which man must offer an immediate and fragmentary repentance. Islam also holds that, whether a man repents or not, he is thrown upon the will of Allah. In a very famous book which has been studied in the schools of Islamic theology for over 500 years, al Nasafi writes:[9] ‘And Allah does not forgive the one who joins another with Himself, but He pardons any sin except this, whether great or small, to whomsoever He wills.’ To this his commentator al Taftazani adds the comment: ‘With, or without, repentance.’
Thus, once again, we find that the doctrines of Islam, like those of Biblical theology, are inseparably connected with its concept of Deity. The doctrine of repentance in Islam is related to the central doctrine of Allah and His creative will; and, just as the difference between ‘small’ and ‘great’ sins becomes negligible when either may be forgiven or punished, with or without repentance, so the difference between a repentant and an unrepentant sinner has no ultimate significance, when viewed in the light of that absolute Will which punishes or pardons as it pleases.
The most striking differences between the Christian and the Muslim doctrines of repentance are revealed in the Muslim concept of a fragmentary repentance for isolated acts of sin, and by the contexts in which the word is used. In the Bible the use of the word is charged with a sense of the grievousness of sinful acts and of that underlying spiritual condition which alienates a man from God. Before a holy, righteous Father, the repentant sinner cries, ‘Against Thee, Thee only have I sinned,’ and knows that he must turn away from that which separates him from his Maker. On the other hand, as we have seen, in Islam the only sin for which there can be no forgiveness is the sin of ‘shirk’ (association of others with the worship of Allah); in all other respects Allah forgives or not as He wills. And if Allah both creates man’s thought and reason and also turns his heart, then the Biblical sense of the horror of sin and and the spiritual significance of repentance disappear.[10]
Both Christian and Muslim must acknowledge their ignorance of the mystery of the Divine will and the manner of its working; but whereas the Muslim can have no confidence concerning the workings of an unconditioned, omnipotent will, the Christian who acknowledges ‘a faithful Creator’ (1 Pet. 4:19) may echo words which no Muslim can utter: ‘Abba, Father . . . not what I will, but what Thou wilt’ (Mark 14:36).
Notes
1 This sect was known as the ‘Qadariya’ for this reason.
2 Ihya ulum al Din, Vol. I, Book I, Chap. 7, Sect. 1.
3 There has been a good deal of controversy among the orthodox theologians concerning the connection between reasoning and knowledge. al Bennani, in his commentary on a book of Logic called the Sullam (Cairo, 1901, pp. 210-212), states that orthodox theologians hold that Allah creates knowledge of the conclusion, following the act of reasoning, without any intermediary. The power of Allah does not create the one without the other. Other theologians hold that the connection between reasoning and knowledge is merely a matter of habit established by Allah, and if Allah willed He might create the two premisses of a syllogism in man’s mind without creating the knowledge of the conclusion. It should be noted that in both types of orthodox opinion it is required that reasoning and knowledge be regarded as the direct and immediate creations of Allah. See al Irshad (Paris 1938), Chap. I, Sec. 2, note (a).
4 Ihya ulum al Din, Vol. 1. Book 1, Chap. 3, Sect. 3/3; Muslim Tamil edition, page 252.
5 These two Traditions may be found in Goldsack’s Selections from Muhammadan Traditions, pp. 8, 179.
6 Another root used, N D M, means ‘regret’. It is used of man regretting sins of thought and action. It is not unlike the Hebrew root N H M, used in Jeremiah 31:19.
7The root used in verse 27 is also used in Surah 42 v. 12: ‘Allah elects for Himself whom He pleases and guides unto Himself him who turns repentant.’ The root used in verse 28 is also used in Surah 38 v. 55: ‘For the rebellious is there an evil resort — Hell!’
8 This epithet is used once of man in Surah 2 v. 222: ‘Allah loves those who turn.’
9This standard work called al Aqa‘id along with its commentary by al Taftazani, has been translated into English by Dr E. E. Elder. It is entitled Commentary of al Taftazani (Columbia Press, New York, 1950); see page 111.
10 In the preceding chapters no mention has been made of the more sombre aspects of Biblical teaching. There is a ‘severity’ in God as well as ‘goodness’ (Romans 11:22). The Bible speaks of God’s wrath (Rom. 1:18, etc) as well as of His grace. The Quran may speak of Allah ‘sealing men’s hearts’ (Surah 47 v. 18), but did not God harden Pharaoh’s heart (Exodus 4:21, etc; cp Surah 10 v. 88), and does not St Paul declare in his comment on this ‘So then He hath mercy on whom he will and whom He will He hardeneth’ (Rom. 9:18)? St Paul then proceeds to rebuke man for his questioning concerning the Divine will, and in so doing helps us to understand the true nature of the problem. We read in the Bible that the Divine will requires that God’s saints should suffer, and indeed our Lord Himself was delivered up to death ‘by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God’ (Acts 2:23). We have therefore no reason to suppose that God does not subject the wicked and proud of heart to the chastisement of His wrath, whatever form that chastisement may take.
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