IN the previous chapter we began to discuss the question whether man’s inner experience is determined in the same way as his outward acts by Allah’s external appointment and decree. Having now studied the creative and controlling part which Islam ascribes to Allah in the spheres of human reason and repentance, we must next consider the Muslim conceptions of Faith and Love.
Before entering on the study of the Muslim doctrines of faith (and there is, as we shall see, more than one doctrine which is accepted by orthodoxy), there are certain historical details connected with its development which must first be noted. Discussion about the nature of faith arose early in Muslim history, largely as a result of political strife. After the assassination of Ali, the fourth Khalifa, and the rise to power of the rival house of Umaiya, there was much controversy concerning the nature of that faith which makes a man a Muslim. Many of the house of Umaiya were hated by the pious, not only because they were regarded as usurpers of the throne of the empire of Islam, but because they flouted the prescriptions of the Islamic law. Others in the early days of the Umaiyad rule were less eager to disturb the political unity of the Empire on theological grounds, and maintained that it was not their province to judge the faith and morals of the house of Umaiya. They maintained that Allah alone knew the value of man’s faith, and therefore they deferred judgement on such matters. They were, for this reason, known as the Murji’a (those who postpone).
The followers of the Khalifa Ali, who maintained the rights to sovereignty of the ‘Holy family’ (Ali was both son-in-law and cousin of the prophet Muhammad) disagreed with the Murji’a for political and dynastic reasons; whereas the puritan Khawarij disagreed because they stressed the connection of works with faith in establishing the legal status of a believer. The Khawarij held that general faith is not enough and that, despite a verbal confession of Islam, anybody who committed great sins was an unbeliever. It is important therefore to remember that discussions about faith and its connection with works first arose in an atmosphere of political strife. It was largely in the interest of political harmony that later orthodoxy, adopting the attitude of the Murji’a, avoided stressing the need for works as an accompaniment to faith.
The Arabic word for faith (iman) is derived from a root which means ‘to be sure’, ‘to trust’. It may be rendered ‘belief’, and in this sense Islam is a religion of iman. The man who ‘believes’ is a Muslim. When reciting the detailed confession of faith which is entitled ‘Iman al Mufassal’ the Muslim says: ‘I believe in Allah, His angels, His Books, His Prophets, the Last Day and the Day of Resurrection, and in Allah’s predestination of good and evil.’ This confession makes him a believer (as do other confessional statements). He is ‘one who has faith’. There were however many theologians who were not content with so simple a definition of the status of a believer. As we noted in the previous chapter, some theologians distinguished between the faith of the learned and that of the common people, to the detriment of the latter. Such theologians maintained that all faith was not of equal value, and the majority of the followers of al Ashari declared that faith by way of taqlid (slavish adherence to tradition) was not adequate. Such faith, they stated, was only for minds which were incapable of rising to higher things. The propositions of faith must be clarified and supported by reasons and proofs.
Moreover, as we may have already understood from the foregoing statement, the term ‘faith’ not only refers to the fact of believing, but also implies the content of belief. A 19th century Muslim theologian named al Bajuri has expressed this fact in the following way: ‘Faith is the inner assent given to the Prophet of Islam, to that which he has brought to that which he has taught concerning religion. It involves obedience and submission to the message of the Prophet; he who is the true witness of Allah’s revelation.’ The content of faith to which al Bajuri here refers, has documentary form in the Quran and the Traditions as interpreted by the orthodox doctors of Islam. Another important point which must be noted in al Bajuri’s statement is the expression ‘inner assent’. The question of the nature of the assent which is given to the credal propositions of Islam is very important, but not all the orthodox theologians would agree that such assent must be ‘inner assent.’
There have been three main lines of thought[1] regarding the nature of the assent which makes a man a believer:
(1) The unorthodox Mutazila and other sects such as the Khawarij relate faith to practice. They maintain that, along with inner assent, there must be verbal confession and the practice of the law. There must be open confession, observance of the Five Pillars of Islam, and works or supererogation.
(2) The orthodox Abu Hanifa and his followers, as well as some of the school of al Ashari, declare that faith is ‘the confession of the tongue as well as the assent of the intellect.’ This confession is the confession of the short credal statement known as the Shahadat: ‘There is no Deity but Allah; Muhammad is the apostle of Allah.’
(3) The great majority of the followers of al Ashari (like al Bajuri) declare that faith is the inner assent of the intellect that a statement is true. This alone, they maintain, constitutes faith. Confession with the tongue, they add, is only a condition which makes a man a believer before the world. They also hold that works are not an integral part of faith, but are only a condition of perfection for it.
Whatever opinion may be held by Muslims concerning the matter of verbal confession, the question of faith and its nature dominates the history of Muslim theological thought. Even when faith is not thought of as being related to works, it possesses supreme legal importance, in that, through faith, a Muslim attains to his status as a believer. Yet even faith itself cannot be divorced from the creative function of Allah. The orthodox not only hold that the acts of faith are created by Allah and invested in man from without, but also declare that the faith which every believer has in his heart is the portion which Allah destined for him from all eternity.
There is one, and only one, passage in the Quran where it might appear that man’s belief depends on his own will. In Surah 18 v. 28 we read: ‘So let him who will, believe, and let him who will, reject.’ Commentators however suggest that Allah may be the subject of the verb ‘will’ and that this passage refers to Allah’s decree, and therefore means: ‘He that Allah wills to believe, will believe, and he that Allah wills should reject, will reject.’ It might be so rendered without doing violence to the Arabic, but even if it is to be taken with man as the subject, it remains an exception. The Quranic teaching as a whole is expressed in such passages as Surah 6 v. 111: ‘And had we sent down angels unto them. . . they would not have believed, unless that Allah pleased;’ and Surah 10 v. 99 f: ‘Had thy Lord pleased all who are in the earth would have believed altogether. . . . It is not for any person to believe save by the permission of Allah.’[2]
Abu Hanifa declared that faith is identical in every believer, and that believers do not differ in faith, although they may differ in the observance of the prescribed works of the Law. The followers of al Ashari, however, who are equally orthodox, speak of faith increasing or diminishing according to the extent to which the works of the Islamic Law are observed or neglected. Muslims also distinguish between the ‘created faith’ of man and the ‘uncreated faith’ of Allah. Allah also, according to them, is a ‘believer’ by virtue of the perfect knowledge which He has of Himself.
Another important point must be made concerning orthodox Islam’s view of faith. The faith of Abraham is set forth in the Quran as the pattern of all human faith, but we must not therefore assume that Islam understands faith in terms of chapter 3 of the letter of St Paul to the Galatians. The Biblical ‘faith of Abraham’ is far removed from the legal bondage of Islam. According to Muslim orthodoxy the ‘faith of Abraham’ was ‘an act of judgement by which a thing is held to be true.’ This act of judgement, state the Islamic theologians, is faith, and according to the school of thought preferred, such faith may or may not be connected with verbal confession and acts of practice. Moreover, there is no difference between the act of judgement by which a man holds anything whatsoever to be true, and the act of judgement which is called ‘faith’ in Islam. Although such acts of judgement may differ in their content, yet the operation itself is the same, and all alike are acts of reasoning created by Allah in man. ‘It is not for any person to believe, save by the permission of Allah.’
There is just one more point to be noted which will assist the reader to distinguish more clearly between the Christian and Muslim conceptions of faith. When a Muslim recites the creed called Iman al Mufassal (see p.77) his ‘act of judgement’ is not made upon any real knowledge of the matters referred to in that creed. There cannot possibly be any equation between the propositions of the creed (which Allah has made known to man in verbal form) and the transcendent truths which these propositions are supposed to represent. Allah creates the faith in man which holds such propositions to be true, but a Muslim cannot hope to comprehend all the realities which are verbally symbolized in the creed. In particular, there can be no relation between these credal propositions and the objective transcendent truth of Allah and the mystery of His being. By faith the Muslim does not lay hold of Allah Himself, however imperfectly.
It is true that, in both Islam and Christianity, faith is described as being a ‘saving faith’ but, apart from that purely verbal similarity, there is no other point at which one can discern common ground in the Christian and Muslim doctrines of faith. Biblical theology speaks of a faith by which a man is justified and restored to fellowship with God. The Biblical use of the word denotes a right relationship with God, a real relationship which is made possible for man through the self-giving of God in His Son and the Holy Spirit. The Biblical usage reveals that ‘faith’ means cleaving to a Person rather than subscribing to a body of doctrine. It expresses a direct personal relationship of trust. By this faith man is justified, clothed upon with a righteousness not his own, saved, sustained and re-created. Man grows into the divine nature by his personal response to the grace of God, grace which is directly present and bestowed in the Person of His Son, Jesus Christ our Lord. God the Father is not inaccessible nor is faith an act of judgement on propositions which have no real relation to the transcendent mystery. The Christian cannot know God as one knows the truth of a proposition, but he can know God within a personal relationship of grace. The Christian could only agree with the Muslim that faith cannot bring him to God, if he thought of faith in terms of an exact comprehension of the meaning of credal propositions and regarded it as a mere exercise of the intellect. The Christian does not claim that faith lays bare the heart of the Divine mystery, but, through his faith he does have fellowship with God, just as he lays hold of the love of his dear ones, although ignorant of the mystery of their inner personal life and the constitution of their being.[3]
We now turn to the second subject under discussion in this chapter; the Christian and Muslim conceptions of love.
The Muslim conception of man’s love for Allah and Allah’s love for His creatures is, as one might expect, consistent with man’s position as an entirely dependent slave and with Allah’s self-sufficiency. In the article on ‘Blessedness’ in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, D. B. Macdonald states that: ‘Love in man is not the same as love in Allah. In man, love is the inclination of the soul towards something that suits it, is lacking in it, and from the gaining of which it expects profit and pleasure. This is impossible in Allah, the Perfect, the Unchangeable, who can contemplate nothing but Himself and His own acts. . .’
The attribute of love in Allah is denoted by one of his Ninety-nine Beautiful Names. He is called ‘al Wadud’ (the Loving) in Surah 85 v. 14; and, according to the great lexicographer Lane, this epithet means that Allah is loving towards His servants and towards those who obey Him; it signifies Allah’s approbation of His righteous servants and also means that He is beloved in the hearts of His servants. This Arabic root W D D is used of Allah in a few other passages in the Quran. Allah will grant love to those who believe and act aright (Surah 19 v. 96). Allah is also called ‘the Merciful, the Loving’ in Surah 11 v. 92, and ‘the Forgiving, the Loving’ in Surah 85 v. 14. Allah places love between those who are hostile to each other (Surah 60 v. 7) and between man and wife (Surah 30 v. 20). It is also of interest to note that in Surah 64 v. 1 Allah says: ‘O ye who believe! take not my enemy and your enemy for patrons, encountering them with love.’ It is also noteworthy that in the Quran this root is never used for man’s love of Allah, although Lane, in the passage quoted above, suggests that it may be used in this way.
The root which is more often employed in the Quran of Allah’s love of man, man’s love of Allah, and man’s love of man, is H B B. The well-known word ‘mahabbat’ is derived from this root, and Tahanawi has a long article in his book Kashshaf Istilahat al Funun, dealing with the significance of this word. He states that it means ‘inclination, liking or preference.’ The love of Allah for believers is Allah’s perpetual intention of benevolence. The love of the creature for Allah is the creature’s intention to obey his Lord. Tahanawi then quotes a passage from al Razi’s Tafsir al Kabir, where Razi declares that man can only love that which is lawful, and therefore he cannot love the essence of Allah or His attributes. Man’s love for Allah means that he loves to obey Allah, loves His service, His rewards, His favour.
From a Christian point of view, the most significant passages in the Quran are those wherein we are told what Allah does not love. Allah does not love ‘evil doing’ (Surahs 2 v. 201; 28 v. 77). This may surprise the reader since Islam holds that Allah is the Creator of man’s evil acts, but, as has already been pointed out, such people as Abu Hanifa hold that evil acts may be done by Allah’s permission but they are not done ‘with His good pleasure.’ Allah does not love ‘the unbelievers’ (Surah 3 v. 29; 30 v. 44) and the unjust (Surah 3 v. 50; 42 v. 38). Allah does not love ‘those who transgress’ (Surahs 5 v. 89; 7 v. 53), or the fraudulent sinner (Surah 4 v. 107). There are other such passages which make it clear that Allah does not consider the sinner apart from his sin; both are unlovely to Him.[4]
Man’s love of Allah is referred to in such passages as Surah 5 v. 59, where Allah declares that He ‘will bring a people whom He loves and who love Him.’ Muhammad the prophet is also told to declare: ‘If ye love Allah, then follow me, and Allah will love you and forgive you your sins’ (Surah 3 v. 28). Among the many references to ‘love of the things of this world’ and the love of man for man, perhaps the most significant is to be found in Surah 3 v. 115, where the believers are warned against unbelievers and are told: ‘Ye it is who love them, but they love not you.’ There is a hint of reproach in these words which is in marked contrast with Christ’s words recorded in St Matthew’s Gospel (5:44-47).
When we consider the teaching of the Quran and the comments of Muslim theologians on the subject of love, certain outstanding features should be noted. We have already drawn attention to the fact that Allah does not love sinners, and the equally important orthodox opinion that man cannot love Allah Himself. Allah, in His mystery, remains inaccessible, and man may only love that which is lawful, i.e., Allah’s ‘service, rewards, and favour’.[5] There is also another important point which is worthy of notice, namely, the literal significance of those Quranic terms which, unfortunately, are rendered ‘love’ in English translations of the Quran. The root W D D literally signifies ‘approbation, approval’ and the root H B B means ‘preference’. If then we use a word derived from the latter root (mahabbat) to refer to God’s love for sinners — as we often do when talking with Muslims — it must seem it the Muslim that we are stating that God ‘likes’ or ‘prefers’ sinners. In our desire to be understood by Muslims, we have to borrow Islamic terms, but we must remember that such terms have a vastly different significance within Islam. No terms borrowed from Islam, can by themselves, be an adequate vehicle for the expression of Christian truth. We must be prepared to explain the sense in which we use all such words, and cannot assume that the terms alone will convey the truth.
A case in point is the common affirmation of Christianity and Islam that man has no right to the Divine favour. This similarity is however only apparent, for Islam not only regards man as an unworthy slave, but also paradoxically applies some test of ‘worthiness’ in that the Quran excludes sinners from the love of Allah. And the divine love itself is understood by the orthodox in the sense of ‘approval’ or ‘preference’, rather than as love in the Biblical sense. Similarly, the erotic language of certain Sufis cannot be compared to the Christian doctrine, which understands man’s love for God as his response to the self-giving of God in Christ.
God the Father’s gracious love is inseparably related to His righteous purposes, as He seeks fellowship with man. This is the precious truth which can only be found in the Christian Gospel. In the Old Testament, God’s righteous and redemptive love for His sinful and rebellious people is central to the Divine covenant, and in the New Testament the full meaning of this love is revealed in the self-committal and self-giving of God in His eternal Son. This is the Gospel of eternal life which is given to men in Him alone: ‘God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself.’ Man may, by faith, lay claim to the benefits of that Divine sacrifice; but in Islam there is no place for such faith, or for the love which God the Father has revealed in His righteous, sacrificially-redemptive act of grace.
Notes
1 See Gardet and Anawati, Introduction à la theologie Musulmane (Paris 1948), pp. 322 ff., for this arrangement, also for information on al Bajuri.
2 Man does not remain ‘in the faith’ except by Allah’s permission, and a Muslim cannot be certain that he will die in the faith in which he lived. Allah may remove his faith at the last. For this, see al Ghazali, Ihya ulum al Din, the final topic of Vol. I, Book 2; Muslim Tamil version, pp. 285 ff.
3 This question of the relationship of grace between God and man will be dealt with more fully in the following chapter.
4 This summarizes the teaching of the Quran, but orthodox theology of the Asharite school identifies the divine will with love and comes to other conclusions. See Appendix B, ‘The Divine will and its love.’
5 It is interesting to compare 1 Corinthians 2:9 with al Ghazali’s statement in Ihya ulum al Din (Vol. I, Book 1, Part 2 sect. 3; Muslim Tamil version, page 43, col. 1): ‘. . . the things prepared (in heaven) by Allah the Most High for righteous slaves (are such as) eye has not seen and ear has not heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man. . .’ There is no reference here to man’s love for God. See also W. C. Klein, Elucidation of Islam’s Foundation (New Haven 1940), p. 62 and Goldsack, Selections from Muhammadan Traditions, pp. 227 f.
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